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People vote over risk-sharing rules to cope with random revenues. Risk-sharing rules
are enforced through peer pressure: those who comply exert a negative externality on
those who do not. People are di®erently a®ected by this externality. I determine the
elected risk-sharing rules and the level of compliance. It turns out that full risk-sharing
is achieved only if everybody comply. Partial risk-sharing is more often achieved with,
sometime, some level of non-compliance. In many cases, a majority of people votes over
and complies with the risk-sharing rule that maximizes their own expected payo®.
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11 Introduction
High income °uctuations is part of life in developing countries. To cope with a risky environ-
ment, households have developed risk-sharing strategies, including mutual assistance, credit
with contingent repayments, or simply private transfers within extended families, lineage or
kinship groups (Fafchamps 1992, Udry, 1994, Besley, 1995, Fafchamps, 2003, Dercon 2004).
Most of those strategies are informal in the sense that they are not legally enforceable. They
somehow respond to the lack of formal risk-sharing devices, such as private insurance, credit,
welfare-state bene¯ts, health insurance, income redistribution.
In a risky world populated by risk-averse agents, sharing risk is individually e±cient.
People would certainly agree with any rule that increase their welfare by sharing risk among
them. But risk-sharing generally entails some from of income redistribution from the most
successful persons to the less successful ones. Once people are endowed with permanent high
income °ows, they might be reluctant to transfer part of their income. They would certainly
refuse to follow what the risk-sharing rule prescribes (i.e. to share their income), even if
they previously (i.e. before becoming rich) adhered to this rule. This raises the issue of the
enforcement of such risk-sharing rules in economies without legal enforcement systems.
This paper address the issue of the design and enforcement of informal risk-sharing rules. It
models the design of risk-sharing rules as a collective choice through majority voting. People
vote behind a veil of ignorance over future income. This paper also posits an enforcement
mechanism based on social pressure. People decide to comply or not with the risk-sharing
arrangement once they know their income. Those who comply exert a negative externality on
others. Those who do not comply incur an utility loss proportional to the level of compliance.
This externality a®ects people di®erently. Some people are thus more inclined to comply than
others.
Such an enforcement mechanism is limited in the sense it is sometime impossible or, at least
too costly, to make everybody comply with a rule. People are awarded of this enforcement
problem when they design risk-sharing rules. Consequently, unlike in a world with perfect
enforcement, full risk-sharing might not be implementable or even desirable. It is indeed
achieved only if such a rule is ful¯lled by everybody. Otherwise, and more likely, partial risk-
2sharing is achieved. In particular, the model often leads to a political equilibrium where a
majority of people votes for and then complies with the risk-sharing rule that maximizes their
own expected payo®.
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 motivates the main assumptions and relates the
paper with the literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the enforcement
or compliance problem in a non-cooperative game. Section 5 endogenizes the risk-sharing rule
in a voting game. Section 6 examines the individual's incentives to increase personal wealth
when people enforce a risk-sharing rule. Section 7 concludes with two remarks.
2 Motivation and related literature
So far, the design and enforcement of risk-sharing arrangements has been analyzed in repeated
relationships (e.g. Coate and Ravallion, 1993, Ligon, Thomas and Worral, 1997, Genicot and
Ray, 2003, Bloch, Genicot and Ray, 2004, Dubois, Jullien and Magnac, 2005). These papers
have formalized the idea that people are motivated by reciprocity when they perform private
transfers: A rich person agrees to share his higher income because he expects to be paid back
when he is on need. Formally speaking, in these papers, informal risk-sharing arrangements
emerge as self-enforcing contracts among risk-averse agents facing random shocks in a repeated
game.1
Undoubtedly, reciprocity plays a rule in motivating the emergence and perenniality of risk-
sharing arrangements in developing countries. However, it fails to explain why people with
high and secure income levels subsidize poor relatives with limited future opportunities. For
example, Lucas and Stark (1985) observed that migrants remit part of their revenue to their
family even if they do not expect to be paid back. Fafchamps (1995) points out that people
su®ering from incurable diseases, and physical or mental handicap, are not excluded from the
mutual assistance network. Fafchamps (2003) also questions the support to old people who are
likely to be net recipient of assistance and, due to short like expectancy, have not much time
left to reciprocate. He argues that, in order to obtain this support, old people have granted
1I should add that the literature also pointed out altruism as a motive for informal risk-sharing (see e.g.
Dearden and Ravallion, 1988).
3a lot of political and economic power in pre-industrial society. They are thus armed to exert
pressure and social sanctions to younger people.
More importantly, the repeated game approach ignores the in°uence of communities (fam-
ilies, villages, kinships,...) on individual's behavior. It postulates that people enter into risk-
sharing agreements on an individual basis in an economic environment free of any obligation,
customary law or social norm. In contrast, anthropologists emphasize the role of the com-
munity (the extended family, lineage or kinship group) in the behavior of individuals within
traditional societies, especially regarding redistribution and mutual assistance (see Platteau,
2000, Fafchamps, 2003). They argue that unwritten rules and behavioral codes do exist in
these communities. When people make choices, they take into account how their behavior will
be perceived by the members of their group. Thus, a person's behavior should be analyzed
in conjunction with his community. I brie°y illustrate this point with two anthropological
studies.
The ¯rst one, \Kwanim Pa", by Wendy James (1979), analyzes the behavior of the Uduk,
an ethnic group of cultivating people located in the Sudan-Ethiopian borderlands. The author
argues that strong sharing obligations within the so-called birth-group based on principles of
equality do exist in the Uduk society. She writes:
\Between persons, there are conventional expectations of cooperation and sharing in terms of
which the Uduk judge individual behavior."
This means that not only agricultural production must be shared, but also the work must be
fairly distributed within the community. James argues that man is duty-bound not only to
cultivate ¯elds for himself and his immediate dependants, but also to assist in the cultivation of
other men's ¯elds, especially those of his immediate birth-group. To avoid public disapproval,
he must be careful not to work too hard on his own ¯elds at the expense of others. If his
¯elds appear to do surprisingly well, he will be criticized to the same extent as if he has
shirked his duty. He will be perceived as having invested far more e®ort in his own ¯elds, than
on the land of others, for the purpose of self-enrichment.2 Not surprising, amassing wealth
2James reported that a man sabotaged his own successful new plants because he was afraid people might
think he was trying to get rich!
4without sharing, is disapproved in Uduk communities as in many others traditional society
(see Platteau, 1996 for further evidence).3
The second ethnographic work, \Palms, Wine, and Witnesses" by David J. Parkin (1972),
about in the Giriama of Southern Kenya, highlights the importance of redistribution in a
society relying on customary law. The Giriama's economy is based on palm trees which
requires long term investment and, therefore, secure property rights. Parkin argues that it
involves a \redistributional economy", in which wealth is mainly invested in the \purchase"
of people for support on matters such as such as the ownership of land, palm trees, moveable
inherited wealth, or bridewealth.4
The anthropological literature suggests two levels of decision-making in traditional soci-
eties: The community level and the individual level. The community designs rules that must
be followed by its members. People are governed by these informal rules which are enforced
through social pressure: Those who deviate su®er from public disapproval and social sanc-
tions.5
Accordingly, in this paper, risk-sharing is an informal rule designed democratically by the
community members.6 Then each member individually decides to comply or not with the
elected risk-sharing rule. People su®er from social pressure and/or sanctions if they do not
comply. This translates formally in the model into an utility loss which is proportional to the
level of compliance within the community.
This paper is not the ¯rst to model the cost of deviating from social norms as an utility
loss. In his theory of social customs, Akerlof (1980) assumes that person's utility include his
reputation within the community he or she belongs. As in the present paper, deviating from
social customs imply a loss of reputation proportional to the level of norm obedience. The
3For the Uduk, the sole way to save is to convert crop surplus into animal wealth. This is precisely because
animals are jointly owned by birth-group members.
4In addition, since palm wine cannot be preserved more than a couple of days, it cannot be stored until
periods of scarcity (as precautionary saving). Any surplus is thus spread out in the kinship neighborhood
through a system of redistributional obligation.
5In a more general perspective, notice that this approach is consistent with Elster (1989)'s view that social
norms include a penalty to sanction disobedience.
6It is modeled as a direct voting process.
5idea of including the opinion of others as a commodity into one agent utility function goes
back, at least, to Becker (1974). In labor economics, Kandel and Lazear (1992) have modeled
peer pressure on work norms in a similar way.
This utility loss from deviating from informal rules (such as solidarity obligation) has
several interpretations. First of all, it captures personal's feelings such a guilt or shame.7
As argued in Elster (1998), these feelings can be modeled as utility losses that depend on
the morality of other agents in regard to the code of behavior. The larger the percentage
of the population adhering to this code, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. This
formalization in consistent with experimental evidences that people's behaviors are judged,
reward or sanctioned by peers (see GÄ achter and Fehr, 1999, or Barr, 2001).8
Secondly, it might also model a pecuniary sanction such as exclusion from resources con-
trolled by the community (e.g. land as in Parkin, 1972, common-pool resources such as forest,
¯shery, water, inheritance as in Hoddinott, 1994) or others punishment from any form of
informal justice (e.g. witchcraft).9 These sanctions are more likely to be applied and to be
costly as more people follow the rule. Therefore, the more people ful¯ll the rule, the higher is
the expected penalty for those who deviate.
The paper is related to the literature on the political economy of unemployment insurance.
It shares several features with Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999)'s paper in which people
vote over redistribution schemes from the workers to the jobless in an economy where living
o® one's own work is a social norm. They introduce a similar utility loss proportional to
the adherence to the working social norm which a®ects those who live on welfare. However,
Lindbeck and al. (1999) focus on redistribution with an exogenous working norm with legal
enforcement (at no cost), whereas I endogenize a risk-sharing rule with peer pressure as a
7This may explain why a large part of private transfers are performed during social event and ceremonies (e.g.
funerals in Parkin, 1972), i.e. when people's behavior regarding gifts are observable by the whole community.
8In Harsanyi's words \People's behavior can largely be explained in terms of two dominant interests: economic
gain and social acceptance" John Harsanyi (1969) (cited by GÄ achter and Fehr, 1999).
9According to Platteau (1996) sorcery or witchcraft serves as a form of social justice in many traditional
societies. Also Parkin (1972) notices that \the assumption seems to be widespread in Africa that economically
successful persons are likely to su®er the sorcery or witchcraft of those who feel relatively deprived." Consistently
to the model, people might di®er on their vulnerability to sorcery.
6device to enforce redistribution. Here, people vote within an uncertain world behind a veil of
ignorance over their future income. In contrast, in Lindbeck and al. (1999), people perfectly
foresight their own income when they vote. As a consequence, people are less prone to redistri-
bution: If workers constitute a majority, the unique political equilibrium prescribes no income
redistribution at all.10 In contrast, here, the political equilibrium entails some redistribution
even with a majority of tax payers.
In Wright (1986), people vote on an unemployment insurance policy knowing their current
employment status but under uncertainty on their future status. The elected unemployment
insurance policy maximizes the expected utility of current employed voters because their
constitute a majority of voters. Since their are currently tax payers, they prefer uncomplete
insurance. Wright does not address the issue of enforcement. His partial insurance result is
due to the predominance of tax payers and not on enforcement problems. I now introduce the
model.
3 The model
A community is composed of a continuum of individuals of measure 1. Agents have quasi-
linear preferences on consumption C and peer disapproval or social sanction S represented
by the utility function u(C) ¡ µS. The function u is assumed increasing and strictly concave
(u0 > 0 and u00 < 0). All agents are thus equally risk averse but they are di®erently a®ected
by peer disapproval/social sanction S. The parameter µ represents individual's taste for social
sanction: Agents with a higher (lower) µ are more (less) hurt by the same sanction S. It is
private information distributed in £ = [µ; ¹ µ] according to a publicly known density function
f. The cumulative is denoted F. The function f is strictly positive and twice continuously
di®erentiable on £. A person endowed with a utility parameter µ will be referred as a µ-person
or a person of type µ.
Each agent produces a random income which is high ¹ y with probability p and low y with
probability 1¡p, with ¹ y > y. Agents face independent and identical probability distributions.
An agent who receives ¹ y (y), henceforth quali¯ed as \successful" or \rich"(\unsuccessful" or
10They introduce altruism to produce some income redistribution emerges with a majority of workers.
7\poor").
A risk-sharing rule is a vector (t;r) 2 R+ £ R+. t is the tax paid by a successful/rich
person while r is the subsidy received by a unsuccessful/poor person. It forces a rich person
to consume only ¹ y ¡ t and allows a poor person to consume y ¡ r. A risk-sharing rule must
be budget balanced in the sense that what is given to the poor must be entirely ¯nanced by
what is collected within the rich population share. However, some rich might not comply with
the rule, i.e., not pay the tax t. We therefore denote ¹ the proportion of compliance to the
rule within the rich population (with 1 · ¹ · 1). Since the 1¡p poor receive r and a share ¹
of the p rich pay t, the budget balance constraint writes,
p¹t = (1 ¡ p)r
Each compliant person assigns a ¯x loss of utility s > 0 to a non-compliant person. Since the
1 ¡ p poor and a share ¹ of the p rich comply, the total cost incurred from non-complying is
S = (1 ¡ p + ¹p)s.
In the above framework, people make two choices. First, they vote over risk-sharing
rules. Second, they individually decide wether to comply or not with the elected rule which
means paying the tax t if they are rich.11 The design of a risk-sharing rule is a collective
choice selected ex ante, i.e. before observing income, or under a \veil of ignorance".12 The
compliance strategy is an individual choice undertaken non-cooperatively ex post, i.e. after
observing income. It leads to Nash equilibria level of compliance to the elected rule. In what
follows, we proceed by backward induction: We ¯rst analyze the second choice (i.e. compliance
to a given risk-sharing rule, Section 4) before turning to the ¯rst choice (vote for a risk-sharing
rule, Section 5).
4 Compliance with a risk-sharing rule
In this section, we ¯nd out the Nash equilibria of the compliance non-cooperative game.
11A poor would obviously comply with a rule that provides more consumption.
12To be precise, the veil of ignorance is on income but not on references since each agent knows her µ when
she votes. It is not a veil of ignorance on income opportunities because the probability p is perfectly forecasted
and homogeneous.
8First, consider a poor person. Of course, it is in his self-interest to comply: his consumption
is increased and he does not su®er from any social disapproval. Therefore, all poor individuals
comply, thereby enjoying an utility of u(y + r).
Second, consider a rich person of type µ. If he complies, he consumes only ¹ y ¡ t but does
not su®er from any social sanction, thereby enjoying a utility level u(¹ y¡t). If he does not, he
consumes all his revenue ¹ y but su®ers from public disapproval. The social pressure exerted by
the 1¡p poor who comply and ¹ of the p rich who comply yields an utility loss (1¡p+p¹)s.
The agent of type µ's utility is thus u(¹ y)¡µ(1¡p+p¹)s. For a given proportion of compliant
rich ¹, the rich µ-person decides to comply if:
u(¹ y ¡ t) ¸ u(¹ y) ¡ µ(1 ¡ p + p¹)s;
that is,
µ ¸
u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
(1 ¡ p + p¹)s
:
To properly characterize the critical taste ~ µ which divides the rich population among those
who comply (those of type µ ¸ ~ µ), and those who do not (those of type µ < ~ µ), we need new
notation. Let ¹ ¹ denote the minimum proportion of an compliant rich that convinces an agent
of type µ = ¹ µ to comply, formally:
u(¹ y ¡ t) = u(¹ y) ¡ ¹ µ(1 ¡ p + p¹ ¹)s:
I assume that the sanction imposed by the poor share of the population alone does not induce
the rich of higher type ¹ µ to comply, i.e., ¹ ¹ > 0. Let ¹ denote the minimum level of compliance
within the rich population that convinces agent µ = µ to comply. It is de¯ned by:
u(¹ y ¡ t) = u(¹ y) ¡ µ(1 ¡ p + p¹)s:
Hence, ¹ ¹ and ¹ are respectively de¯ned by ¹ ¹ = u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
¹ µps
¡1 ¡ p
p ; and ¹ = u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
µps ¡
1 ¡ p
p : Since ¹ µ > µ, then ¹ ¹ < ¹. Notice that ¹ does not exist if agent µ does not comply
when ¹ = 1. That is, if u(¹ y ¡ t) < u(¹ y) ¡ µs: In this case, we set ¹ = 0. We will denote
^ s(t) = u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
µ as the lower bound on s that could make everyone comply to a given
risk-sharing rule (t;r).




> > > <
> > > :
µ if ¹ > ¹
u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
(1 ¡ p + p¹)s if ¹ ¸ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹
¹ µ if ¹ < ¹ ¹
(1)
While expecting ¹, people with µ ¸ ~ µ(¹) (respectively µ < ~ µ(¹)) comply (do not comply) with
(t;r). We now set up the proportion of rich who comply for a given ~ µ. Since f is the density







¹ = 1 ¡ F(~ µ): (2)
The Nash equilibria level of compliance within the rich population ¹¤ are determined by
combining equations (1) and (2). They are de¯ned by:




> > > > <
> > > > :
1 if ¹¤ > ¹
1 ¡ F
µ
u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
(1 ¡ p + p¹¤)s
¶
if ¹ ¸ ¹¤ ¸ ¹ ¹
0 if ¹¤ < ¹ ¹
(3)
Mathematically, here, an equilibrium is a ¯xed point. Since the right-hand side in (3) is
increasing and continuous on [0;1], there exists at least one ¯x point.
Figures 1 and 2 below provides two graphic illustrations in the case µ uniformly distributed
in [µ; ¹ µ]. It represents the function ~ µ(¹) de¯ned in (1) by the plain line and the relation (2)































3 where none of the rich comply (¹¤
3 = 0) always exists. Other equilibria
may exist, depending on the economic environment. There is one equilibrium ¹¤
1 with high
compliance level (full compliance in Figure 1 and partial compliance in Figure 2) and one
equilibrium ¹¤
2 with low compliance level. If s ¸ ^ s(t), then the peer-pressure is high enough
to make everybody comply and, therefore, ¹¤
1 = 1. Graphically, when s increases, the plain
curve moves downward in Figure 2 and crosses the vertical axe when s ¸ ^ s(t). Otherwise, i.e.
when s < ^ s(t), some rich people deviate from the risk-sharing rule.
Clearly, in general, the game leads to several equilibrium levels of compliance. Multiplicity
of equilibria raises the question of the equilibrium selection that I address now.




3 are stable. These unstable equilibria are unlikely to arise because
there are di±cult to sustain.13 They are therefore excluded. An interior equilibrium ¹¤ is
locally stable if it satis¯es:14
1 + f(~ µ(¹¤))~ µ0(¹¤) > 0: (4)




u0(¹ y ¡ t)
(1 ¡ p + p¹¤)s
1 + f(~ µ(¹¤))~ µ0(¹¤)
< 0: (5)
Second, the risk-sharing rule itself coordinates people's expectation on an unique level of
compliance through the budget balance. Indeed, knowing the level of per-capita tax t and
subsidy r, people can perfectly foresight the unique stable equilibrium level of compliance that
balances the risk-sharing rule. Formally, they compute ¹¤ that satis¯es:
p¹¤t = (1 ¡ p)r: (6)
13Indeed, a deviation from a (positive measured) subset of agents from ¹
¤





people readjust their expectations following a t^ atonnement process. Consider, for instance, a deviation from
the out-of-equilibrium level of compliance ¹
0 6= ¹
¤
2. Assume that, staring from the expected level of compliance
¹









0 denotes the ¯rst derivative of the function ~ µ. Notice that the interior stable equilibrium is unique if the
proportion of type µ agents is not decreasing with µ.
12When deciding to comply or not, a rich person expects the level of compliance to satisfy (6).
Doing so, she selects a single equilibrium among the set of equilibria. Moreover, in the voting
process, people only consider the risk-sharing rules that are budget-balanced by a stable level
of compliance as potential candidates. Formally, they vote only on the risk-sharing rules (t;r)
for which there exists a level of compliance ¹¤ that satis¯es equations (3), (4) and (6). I now
turn to the voting process.
5 Political equilibria
A rule (t;r) such that there exists an equilibrium level of compliance ¹¤ that satis¯es (3), (4)
and (6) will be referred as a feasible risk-sharing rule. The set of such risk-sharing policies is
denoted ©.15 Risk-sharing rules must be feasible to be candidate.
When deciding to vote for or against a feasible risk-sharing rule (t;r) 2 ©, an arbitrary
agent of type µ computes his expected payo® if he complies,
Uc(t;r) = pu(¹ y ¡ t) + (1 ¡ p)u(y + r); (7)
as well as his expected payo® if he does not,
Un(t;r;µ) = pfu(¹ y) ¡ µ(1 ¡ p + ¹¤p)sg + (1 ¡ p)u(y + r); (8)
where ¹¤ is de¯ned by (3) and (6), and satis¯es (4).
Anticipating her future compliance choice, a person's expected payo® with the risk-sharing
policy (t;r) is the maximal value of (7) and (8), formally,
U(t;r;µ) = maxfUc(t;r);Un(t;r;µ)g:
A person prefers (t;r) 2 © to (t0;r0) 2 © if and only if U(t;r;µ) ¸ U(t0;r0;µ).
In this section, I ¯rst establish some general results on a class of political equilibria. Second,
I illustrate those equilibria and discuss other equilibria with an example. Third, I examine
the welfare properties of the political equilibria.
15It is easy to show that © is not empty. Indeed, if both transfers are zero, then all individuals enforce the
policy which is budget balanced (at zero) and stable. This establishes that (0;0) 2 ©.
135.1 The best compliant rule as a Condorcet winner
Let introduce some speci¯c risk-sharing rules. First, the best compliant rule is the risk-sharing




Uc(t;r) subject to (t;r) 2 ©: (9)
Second, µ's best uncompliant rule is the rule that maximizes a µ-person's expected utility
when she does no comply. Denoted (tµ;rµ), it solves,
max
t;r
Un(t;r;µ) subject to (t;r) 2 ©: (10)
Assume that the solution to (9) and (10) are unique for every µ.16 Denote the median voter
µm. The next proposition provides a necessary condition on the median voter's preferences
that insures the election of the best compliant rule.
Proposition 1 If Uc(tc;rc) ¸ Un(tµm;rµm;µm) then the best compliant risk-sharing rule (tc;rc)
is a Condorcet winner and a majority of rich complies.
(Proof are relegated to the Appendix). Figure 3 below represents people's expected payo®s
when the above condition holds.
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16For instance, assume that f
0(µ) ¸ 0 for every µ 2 £.
14The plain lines represents individual's expected payo®s for every µ. The horizontal line
represents people's expected utility when (tc;rc) is elected and they comply with it, whereas
the line with negative slope represents people's expected utility when (tµm;rµm) is elected and
they do not comply with it. The starting assumption is that the median voter is better-o®
with the ¯rst option. In this case, the majority complies with (tc;rc). By de¯nition of (tc;rc),
those who comply cannot increase their expected payo® with another rule. For them, the only
way to increase their payo® is to elect a rule they do not comply with, preferably their best
uncompliant rule. But, by assumption, the median's voter uncompliant rule yields a lower
expected payo® to the median voter. In addition, the µ's best uncompliant rule yields lower
expected payo® to any individuals of type µ ¸ µm because those persons are more a®ected
than the median voter by the social sanction. Since they constitute a majority, no rule can
defeat (tc;rc), which is then a Condorcet winner.
To characterize more precisely the best compliant rule (tc;rc), I assume that f is non-
decreasing, i.e., f0(µ) ¸ 0 for every µ 2 £.17 The best complaint rule is thus de¯ned by the






= u0(¹ y ¡ tc); (11)
with ¹¤ = 1 ¡ F
µ
u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
(1 ¡ p + p¹¤)s
¶
, p¹¤tc = (1 ¡ p)rc and d¹¤
dt · 0.
First, (11) implies that if there is full compliance ( ¹¤ = 1) but full risk-sharing (¹ y ¡ tc =
y +rc) is not achieved, the transfer made is the highest transfer accepted by the agent who is
the least a®ected by social sanction (otherwise, we would have d¹¤
dt = 0, therefore, full risk-
sharing would be implemented). Therefore, even if everybody comply, the rule might impose
only partial risk-sharing.
Second, (11) characterizes the trade-o® between risk-sharing and enforcement. Remember
that the goal of the informal rule is to share risk ex ante by redistributing ex post the revenue.
17This assumption guarantees that, after substituting for the constraints (3) and (6), the objective of program
(9) is concave on t. It is made reasonable by interpreting µ as the individual's distance (physical or psychological)
from the \core" of the community located at µ = ¹ µ. It simply imposes that the proportion of community
members does not increase as we move away from the core of the community.
18The ¯rst and second order conditions are provided in Appendix.
15With fully enforceable rules, the ¯rst-best risk-sharing rules, which is the full risk-sharing rule,
equalizes the individual's marginal utilities in each state of nature (\successful" or \unsuc-
cessful"). Here, due to limited by enforcement, the risk-sharing rule equalizes the marginal
utilities adjusted by the losses resulting from noncompliance. This term re°ects the fact that
when the transfer t is increased, the utility lost when successful does not fully compensate
for the utility earned when unsuccessful. If a successful person has to give one extra unit of
consumption, a unsuccessful person would only receive ¹¤ units for a constant level of compli-
ance. Moreover, an increase of t makes the risk-sharing rule less attractive for the successful
persons. Therefore, the equilibrium level of compliance ¹¤ decreases (Recalls that d¹¤
dt < 0
for stable equilibria). Hence, the increase of the subsidy r is less than ¹¤.
The empirical literature regarding informal risk-sharing has extensively tested and, in
general, rejected a full sharing of (idiosyncratic) risk (e.g. Townsend, 1994, Ligon, Thomas
and Worral, 2002). Corollary 1 provides conditions for the emergence of full risk-sharing.
Corollary 1 Full compliance with the full risk-sharing rule is a necessary condition for the full
risk-sharing rule to be elected. It is also a su±cient condition when Uc(tc;rc) ¸ Un(tm;rm;µm).
In this model but without enforcement problems, full risk-sharing is e±cient. It indeed max-
imizes people's expected utility when everybody comply. If everybody comply with the full
risk-sharing rule, everybody would also comply with less demanding risk-sharing rules. But
such rules assign lower expected payo® to anybody. Therefore people unanimously prefer the
full risk-sharing rule when they all comply with this rule. Full risk-sharing would therefore be
elected when everybody comply with it.
5.2 A three-type example
Assume that the heterogeneity of preferences is reduced to three values µ, µm, ¹ µ, with µ <
µm < ¹ µ, in respective proportion q, qm, ¹ q, in the community, with q + qm + ¹ q = 1. µm is
still the median voter's type which implies q + qm > 1
2 and ¹ q + qm > 1
2. Notice that, due to
the discontinuity of the density function for this three-type case, we cannot use the previous
di®erentiation and integration techniques. Therefore, the optimality conditions previously
16derived will be slightly di®erent. Nevertheless, by restricting to three types of µ, this example
is simple and rich enough to convey some intuition.
First, of course, Corollary 1 still hold: Full risk-sharing is elected if (i) everybody comply
with it and (ii) it is the median voter's best rule. Indeed, in this case, the best compliant rule
(tc;rc) prescribes to share fully risk. Full risk-sharing with full compliance implies the same
level of consumption for all revenues, equals to the average revenue, formally, ¹ y¡tc = y+rc =
p¹ y+(1¡p)y. The full risk-sharing rule is a Condorcet winner when all µ-persons comply with
this rule, i.e., if u(p¹ y + (1 ¡ p)y) ¸ u(¹ y) ¡ ¹ µs.19
Second, when the above condition does not hold (i.e. some people do not comply with
the full risk-sharing rule), the best compliant rule (tc;rc) prescribes only partial risk-sharing.
It can be still with full compliance. In this case, tc is the highest tax that makes a µ-person
comply. Formally, tc is such that u(¹ y¡tc) = u(¹ y)¡ ¹ µs. It can also be with partial compliance.
Since it might be too costly in term of risk-sharing to make everybody comply, people might
prefer an higher tax even if they loose all µ-persons as contributors. Then only individuals
of type µm and ¹ µ comply with (tc;rc). The level of compliance within the rich population is
¹¤ = qm+¹ q. The budget balance constraint writes (qm+¹ q)ptc = (1¡p)rc. The best compliant
rule (tc;rc) is then de¯ned by the following ¯rst-order condition:20
u0(y + rc)(qm + ¹ q) = u0(¹ y ¡ tc):
Such a rule is elected against all other feasible rules when the median voter complies with it,
that is when u(¹ y ¡ tc) ¸ u(¹ y) ¡ µm[1 ¡ p + p(qm + ¹ q)]s.
Third, when the above condition is not satis¯ed, then the best compliant rule is not
elected.21 The median voter's best uncompliant rule, denoted (tµm;rµm), might be elected. In
the present example, tµm is simply the highest tax that a ¹ µ-person is willing to pay. Formally,
tµm is such that a ¹ µ-person is indi®erent between complying or not. It satis¯es u(¹ y ¡ tµm) =
19As before, it is assumed that a agent's weigh is nil in the non-cooperative compliance subgame: When
deciding not to comply, an individual does not consider the simultaneous deviation of all persons of same type.
Nevertheless, the model could accommodate for a simultaneous deviation of all agents of same type without
changing the results qualitatively.
20This condition is a special case of the ¯rst-order condition (11).




µm;µm) not addressed so far.
17u(¹ y) ¡ ¹ µ[1 ¡ p + p¹ q]s. As long as tµm 6= tc, since both tax yields same level of compliance ¹ q,
we have rµm > rc. Given that both rules yield the same level of compliance and, therefore,
the same social sanction S, all those who do not comply with both rules, i.e., people of type
µ and µm, prefer the median voter's best uncompliant rule (tµm;rµm) than the best compliant
rule (tc;rc) because the subsidy is higher: rµm > rc. Since they constitute a majority, then
(tµm;rµm) defeats (tc;rc).
Yet, another rule (other than (tµm;rµm) or (tc;rc)) can be elected still when the median
voter does not comply with (tc;rc). People of type µ and ¹ µ could agree to reduce the tax level
at t0 < tµm in order to make the median voter comply. The elected tax level t0 is then the
highest tax that make the median voter be indi®erent between complying or not. Formally t0
is such that u(¹ y ¡ t0) = u(¹ y) ¡ µm[1 ¡ p + p(qm + ¹ q)]s. For (t0;r0) to be elected, the people
of type µ and ¹ µ must constitute a majority, i.e., we must have ¹ q + q > 1
2. Furthermore, the
µ-persons should prefer (t0;r0) to (tµm;rµm), i.e., Un(t0;r0;µ) ¸ Un(tµm;rµm;µ). For the second
condition to hold, the elected rule must yields a higher subsidy r0 > rµm to compensate for a
higher social sanction due to more compliance (qm + ¹ q instead of ¹ q).
To sum-up, when the best compliant rule is not elected, this example shows ¯rst that the
median voter's uncompliant rule might be elected. In this case, only a minority of people
complies with the elected rule. Moreover, the elected rule maximizes the expected payo® of a
non-compliant person, namely the median voter. Second, a rule which prescribes a \medium"
tax level tc < t0 < tµm might also be elected. This rule is supported by a coalition which
includes people with high µ who comply anyway and people with low µ who do not comply
but can cope with higher disapproval due to a higher level of compliance. In this case, the
median voter's favorite rule is not elected.
Clearly, the above results and example show that people have con°icting interests when
they collectively choose an informal risk-sharing rule. Does that mean that some people are
worse o® with the elected rule? This question is examined in the next subsection.
185.3 Welfare impact of the informal risk-sharing rule
First, it is easy to see that having (tc;rc) elected and enforced is better than the status quo (no
risk-sharing) for everybody. Indeed, when (tc;rc) 6= (0;0),22 then U(tc;rc;µ) ¸ Uc(tc;rc) >
Uc(0;0) for every µ 2 [µ; ¹ µ]. In words, with (tc;rc), everybody gets at least the expected
utility level of a compliant person. Since, by de¯nition, this person is strictly better-o® with
her best complaint rule than with no risk-sharing (as long as no risk-sharing is not the best
compliant rule), then everybody is also strictly better-o® with (tc;rc) than with the status
quo (no risk-sharing). This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If (tc;rc) is elected, then everybody bene¯t from informal risk-sharing.
Proposition 2 implies that some informal risk-sharing would emerge as long as those who
comply are better-o® when sharing risk informally. It therefore provides a su±cient condition
for the election of an informal risk-sharing rule with any voting rule (even with unanimity).
Second, when (tc;rc) is not elected, people comply with a rule that does not maximize their
own expected utility. Rather, the rule maximizes the utility of someone who do not comply
with it. Do the compliant persons are necessarily better-o® with the elected risk-sharing rule
than without any rule? The answer is no. The following proposition provides a condition on
the level of compliance for which those who comply are worse o®.
Proposition 3 If the elected rule yields a level of compliance ¹¤ < u0(¹ y)
u0(y)
then those who
comply do not bene¯t from this elected rule.
The political equilibrium might be such that people comply with a rule that bene¯ts only to
those who do not comply with it. It happens when the level of compliance to the elected rule
is very low and, of course, the best compliance rule is not elected.




c) = (0;0) means that the best compliant rule prescribes no risk-sharing and then is equivalent to the
status quo.
196 Informal risk-sharing and incentives to work
Suppose that after the risk-sharing rule has been elected but before earning revenues, each
individual chooses how much e®ort to devote in trying to become rich (e.g. by working harder).
Formally, people exert an unobservable23 and costly work e®ort e 2 R+, which determines the
probability to become rich p(e). Let assume that this function p is such as p0 > 0, p00 < 0,
p0(0) = 1 and p(1) = 1. Each unit of e®ort costs one unit of utility so that the expected
payo® of a compliant person with e®ort level e and with the risk-sharing rule (t;r) is,
Ue
c(t;r;e) = p(e)u(¹ y ¡ t) + (1 ¡ p(e))u(y + r) ¡ e; (12)
whereas the expected payo® of a uncompliant person µ is,
Ue
n(t;r;e;µ) = p(e)fu(¹ y) ¡ µ®sg + (1 ¡ p(e))u(y + r) ¡ e; (13)
where ®, the proportion of compliance in the population, depends now on people's e®ort
choices.
Each individual µ chooses the e®ort level that maximizes his expected payo® as de¯ned in
(12) for the compliant persons, and in (13) for the uncompliant ones. The following ¯rst-order
conditions characterize the e®orts of the compliant persons ec and the uncompliant persons
of type µ denoted en(µ).24
p0(ec)
¡





u(¹ y) ¡ µ®s ¡ u(y + r)
¢
= 1:
Each individual equalizes the marginal bene¯t (left-hand side) to the marginal cost (right-
hand side) of one unit of e®ort. The marginal bene¯t corresponds to the marginal probability
to become rich times the incremental gain from being rich. Since the uncompliant persons
23Non-observability guarantees that uncompliant persons are not detected through their e®ort choice and,
thus, refused the subsidy r from the community when they become poor.
24Notice that, with a continuum of agents as assumed here, an agent's e®ort has an in¯nitesimal impact
on ®. Therefore, when choosing how much e®ort to devote on work, individuals do not consider the impact
of their e®ort on the proportion of compliance to the rule. Hence, the equilibrium level of compliance is
® =
R ~ µ(¹¤)
µ (1 ¡ p(e
n(µ)))dµ +
R ¹ µ





c are de¯ned below for all µ 2 £.
20have higher ex post utility than the compliant ones when they are rich but same ex post utility
when they are poor, this incremental gain is higher for those who do not comply. Therefore,
those who expect not to comply when getting rich work harder than those who expect to
comply. Formally, since, for any µ < ~ µ(¹¤), u(¹ y)¡µ®s > u(¹ y ¡t), then en(µ) > ec. This leads
to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Those who do not comply to the risk-sharing rule when rich work harder than
those who comply.
This last result explains why too hard workers and too successful persons are disapproved
in many traditional communities as mentioned in the Introduction (see also Platteau, 1996,
for further evidence, and Fafchamps, 2003, page 81, for a discussion on this issue). The
main argument here is that those people are suspected to plan not to ful¯ll the risk-sharing
rule when they will become rich. Hence, risk-sharing obligations discourage the pursuit of
private wealth, not only because the return of investment is lower (the standard argument),
but also because it is perceived as a deliberate deviation from these obligations and, therefore,
sanctioned by the community.25
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a political economy approach to informal risk-sharing. People share
risk by redistributing ex post their income. They vote over ex post redistribution schemes
under a \veil of ignorance" about future income. The redistribution scheme is then enforced
through social pressure: Those who comply exert a negative externality on the others. In this
framework, some risk-sharing (ex post redistribution) might emerge. The political equilibrium
is often such that a majority of people complies with the risk-sharing rule that matches with
their own taste, while the others does not. In this case, the risk-sharing rule is welfare
enhancing for everybody. Yet the political equilibrium might be such that only a minority of
people complies with a risk-sharing rule that maximizes the expected payo® of a non-compliant
25In contrast, in repeated game models of risk-sharing, hard work and success are less likely to be disapproved
since being successful allow to give more to the risk-sharing partners.
21person. In this case and if the level of compliance is su±ciently low, those who comply with
the rule are worse o® than without any risk-sharing rule.
I now conclude with two remarks. First, to keep the analysis tractable, I have assumed
that people vote being ignorant over their income. A more realistic assumption would be to
assume that people know their current revenue when they vote but they are uncertain about
their future revenue as in Wright (1986). This assumption creates some heterogeneity among
the voters. Following Wright (1986), one can expect that the richest ones would favor less
redistribution compared to the poorest ones, especially if rich (poor) people are more likely to
remain rich (poor) in the future. As a result, risk-sharing would still be uncomplete not only
due to limited enforcement but also to ¯t with the tastes of rich people when they constitute
a majority of voters as in Wright (1986).
Second, it might also be more realistic to put some restriction on the social sanction.
Indeed, it seems unlikely that people feel guilty or are punished when a majority of people
behave like them. The social sanction or utility loss from deviating from the rule should be
e®ective only if a majority complies with the rule. This restriction on social sanction would
obviously favor the best compliance risk-sharing rule (de¯ned as the rule that maximizes the
expected utility of those who comply). It would indeed be a Condorcet winner because any
majority in favor of another rule would be composed by those who expect not to comply with
it and, therefore, would never be enforced.
22A Convexity
8¹ : ¹ ¸ ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹, ~ µ(¹) = u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ ®)
[1 ¡ p + p¹]r . We have:
~ µ
0(¹) = ¡p
u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)




2u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
(1 ¡ p + p¹)3s
> 0:





m;µm). I show that (t
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c) is a Condorcet winner. Consider another feasible
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¤p)s;
where ¹
¤ denotes the level of compliance which balances (t
µ;r
µ). Since the right-hand side is strictly negative,
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0). Since they constitute a majority, (t
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c) is elected then agents with µ 2 [µ
m; ¹ µ] comply. They
constitute a majority.
C Proof of Corollary 1
First suppose that everybody comply to complete risk-sharing, hereafter denoted (t
f;r
f). Then everybody
gets in expectation u(E[y]) where E[y] = p¹ y + (1 ¡ p)y. Since the rule is designed to share risk and not to
exacerbate it, the only alternative feasible rule is such that t
0 < t
f. Since it requires to pay less, still everybody
comply with such a rule which means that everybody gets Uc(t
0;r
0) in expectation. However, u concave implies
Uc(t
0;r
0) < u(E[y]) so that everybody prefer (t
f;r
f) to any other feasible rule t
0 < t
f.
Second, suppose that (t
f;r
f) is elected. Suppose further that some persons do not comply to it, i.e.
¹
¤ < 1. Then (t
f;r
f) does not satisfy (11). In other words, it is not the compliant best risk-sharing rule which





D Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the rule (t;r) that balances at the equilibrium level of compliance ¹
¤. ¹









23Furthermore, the concavity of u implies
u
0(y)r ¸ u(y + r) ¡ u(y);
and,
u
0(¹ y)t · u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t):
The three last inequalities imply,
(1 ¡ p)(u(y + r) ¡ u(y)) < p(u(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t));
or, equivalently,
pu(¹ y ¡ t) + (1 ¡ p)u(y + r) < pu(¹ y) + (1 ¡ p)u(y);
i.e., a complaint person's expected utility is lower with (t;r) than without informal risk-sharing.
E First and second order conditions
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Since 1 + f(~ µ(¹
¤))~ µ
0(¹
¤) > 0 for a stable equilibrium, then d¹
¤
dt < 0.
I now verify the second-order condition. Since ~ µ
0(¹
¤) = ¡pu(¹ y) ¡ u(¹ y ¡ t)
(1 ¡ p + p¹
¤)
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c)g:
Substitute ~ µ(¹
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c)g,
where D = [1¡p+p¹
¤¡pf(~ µ(¹
¤))~ µ(¹
¤)]s > 0 (because d¹
¤
dt < 0) and, d~ µ(¹
¤)





0(¹ y ¡ t
c)




00 < 0 and f
0(µ) ¸ 0 for every µ 2 £ by assumption. Hence, the second derivative is strictly negative.
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